Strategic insights on Middle East security and regional dynamics
Analysis: Hezbollah's Arsenal, State Sovereignty, and Regional Security Stakes
In recent months, Lebanon has edged closer to a confrontation over the future of Hezbollah's weapons. Tensions have risen since the 2024 Israel–Hezbollah war, which left parts of southern Lebanon devastated and underscored the fragility of the UN-brokered ceasefire under Security Council Resolution 1701. That resolution, adopted in 2006, called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) alongside UNIFIL, and the disarmament of all armed groups outside state control. Nearly two decades later, its provisions remain only partially implemented, with Hezbollah continuing to operate as the country's most powerful non-state actor.
Against this backdrop, the Lebanese government recently announced a plan to consolidate all arms under state authority by the end of 2025, beginning with the collection of weapons from Palestinian factions. Yet Hezbollah has rejected the initiative outright. The Shi'a armed group has warned that any attempt at forced disarmament could trigger a civil war, recalling the country's traumatic experience between 1975 and 1990. This latest impasse highlights a fundamental dilemma: can Lebanon disarm Hezbollah without threatening the delicate sectarian balance that has long defined its politics? And if so, will the LAF be able to guarantee the country's security against external threats, particularly from Israel?
Hezbollah's leadership has made clear that it views disarmament as an existential threat. Deputy Secretary General Naim Kassem declared earlier this summer that the group would treat the government's plan "as if it doesn't exist," and warned that stripping Hezbollah of its arsenal would serve U.S. and Israeli interests while leaving Lebanon dangerously exposed. He cautioned that "there will be no life in Lebanon" if the government moved forward with its plan to disarm the group.
Hezbollah's arsenal originated in the 1980s, armed and trained by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Lebanese civil war. Despite significant losses in the 2024 war with Israel, the organization still retains substantial firepower and maintains support within Lebanon's Shi'a community.
Hezbollah argues that maintaining its weapon supply is essential to deterring Israeli aggression. Israel's ongoing presence in parts of southern Lebanon, as well as repeated border clashes, reinforce this claim. The Lebanese Armed Forces, despite their professionalism, remain underfunded and lack the heavy weaponry needed to counter the Israeli Defense Forces. This leaves space for Hezbollah to argue that they are the only force capable of defending Lebanon.
Hezbollah has consistently rejected frameworks perceived as externally imposed or that weaken its deterrent capabilities without concrete security guarantees.
The debate over Hezbollah's weapons is shaped as much by Lebanon's past as by its present security concerns. Memories of the 1975–1990 civil war remain vivid, and for many Lebanese communities, the trauma of that conflict continues to shape their views on disarmament. The war's sectarian militias, cycles of violence, and foreign interventions left deep scars and a lasting fear that weakening one group could expose others to retaliation or domination.
The descent of Suwayda into sectarian conflict in July 2025 resonated strongly in Lebanon. For the Druze and Maronite Christians, it reinforced fears that state weakness can quickly give way to bloodshed.
Many Lebanese approach disarmament with caution—balancing sovereignty concerns against the need for a deterrent against Israel and a safeguard in times of crisis.
The tension reflects the broader dilemma: how to balance sovereignty and security without destabilizing the equilibrium that has prevented a return to civil war.
External actors continue to play a decisive role in shaping Lebanon's debate over disarmament and state sovereignty. The United States, through the involvement of envoy Thomas Barak, has positioned itself as a key broker. Barak's initiative links Hezbollah's disarmament to an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, framing it as part of a broader regional security arrangement.
Barak emphasized that the initiative is not premised on coercion but persuasion, with an economic package designed in coordination with Gulf partners such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. This package seeks to provide alternative livelihoods for Hezbollah fighters and their families, who have long relied on Iranian support. The approach reflects a recognition that Hezbollah is not only a military actor but also a political and social network embedded in Lebanon's Shi'a community.
Border tensions simmer but avoid full war. Government pursues symbolic steps against smaller factions while Hezbollah resists. State legitimacy erodes, but sectarian balance holds.
If Hezbollah openly rejects disarmament and re-arms visibly, Israel could act unilaterally. A targeted campaign against weapons depots would likely trigger major retaliation, plunging Lebanon back into destructive war.
Quiet understandings reduce frontline clashes; Hezbollah and Israel mutually pull back. Improves civilian safety but stops short of real disarmament.
Instead of disarmament, weapons are partially registered, monitored, or integrated into LAF structures. Improves predictability but risks backlash if seen as legitimizing Hezbollah's arsenal.
With Gulf and international backing, pilot schemes offer jobs and stipends in exchange for partial arms control. Depends on funding and security guarantees, would be implemented in phases.
Lebanon's disarmament debate reflects unresolved questions of sovereignty, sectarian balance, and regional insecurity. The challenge is not only whether Hezbollah can be disarmed, but whether Lebanon's fragile state institutions can withstand the pressures that such a process would unleash. Any attempt at forced disarmament risks reviving the country's darkest chapters, while indefinite stalemate continues to undermine state legitimacy and leave the south vulnerable to conflict.
For policymakers, the priority over the next 6–12 months should be stability rather than speed. Disarmament, if it is to be viable, must be sequenced with efforts to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces, restore confidence in state institutions, and address the economic collapse that continues to erode public trust.
Ultimately, Lebanon's path forward will be determined as much by its internal debate as by external bargains. For any framework to endure, it must be seen by Lebanese communities not as an imposed solution but as a strategy that safeguards their security, dignity, and sovereignty.
Analysis: Competing Proposals, Regional Dynamics, and the Path Forward
The war in Gaza has led to the formation of a number of competing proposals for the territory's future. These plans diverge sharply in both their sequencing and end goals. They reflect not only different visions for Gaza's reconstruction but also the broader contest over Palestinian governance, Israel's security posture, and the balance of regional power. At stake is not only Gaza's governance but also the stability of the West Bank, where related dynamics are unfolding in parallel. The strategies under discussion in Israel, the Palestinian territories, the wider region, and internationally each carry implications for both Gaza and the West Bank.
Qatar and Egypt have put forward the most comprehensive Arab-backed proposal, structured in two phases. The immediate phase centers on stabilization through de-mining, temporary housing, and urgent humanitarian aid delivery. To manage this phase, the plan envisions a transitional governance structure: an administrative committee of independent Palestinian technocrats endorsed by the Arab League. This body would oversee aid distribution, essential services, and civil affairs, while laying the groundwork for political reconciliation.
The plan's ultimate goal is the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Gaza as the sole governing authority, following a process of elections and reconciliation with rival Palestinian factions. Crucially, the Arab mediators categorically reject any plan that entails the displacement of Gaza's population.
Steve Witkoff, US Special Envoy to the Middle East, formed the initial basis for negotiations. His proposals were subsequently modified by Qatar and Egypt, creating conditions for Hamas to consider limited agreements.
The United States is pursuing two distinct but overlapping tracks:
Championed by parts of the Israeli far-right and entertained by US officials, this controversial approach frames "voluntary migration" as a way to "open" Gaza.
Status: Drawn sharp condemnation from Arab states, UN, and international legal experts who view it as tantamount to forced transfer.
Latest Development: Steve Witkoff announced that President Trump will personally chair a White House meeting on Gaza's future, underscoring the administration's intent to reach a settlement by the end of the year. A comprehensive post-war plan is being prepared that integrates truce negotiations with broader governance and reconstruction strategies.
1. No recognition of a Palestinian state
2. No Hamas role in post-war Gaza
3. No return of PA in its current form
Favor full reoccupation and direct administration of Gaza, in line with "Greater Israel" visions. Resisted by Israeli military chiefs who warn of unsustainable costs.
Support Israeli security control while delegating local administration to vetted Palestinian figures and NGOs. Israel retains borders, security operations, strategic oversight.
Link ceasefire sequencing to hostage issue: phased prisoner releases for hostages while maintaining long-term security control.
| Scenario | Description | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
| Coalition Governance | Gaza administered by local figures, organizations, or community leaders, potentially linked indirectly to PA | Moderate |
| International/Arab Consortium | Negotiated transition to international or Arab consortium, likely US-led | Moderate-High |
| Israeli Security Control | Israel retains overarching security while outsourcing municipal services. Could escalate to full reoccupation | High |
| Forced Transfer/Relocation | Reframed as "voluntary migration," strongly rejected by regional and international stakeholders | Very Low |
| Hamas Persistence | Hamas persists as clandestine armed movement, sustaining long-term insurgency | Very High |
While all scenarios are being discussed, some are far more plausible than others. The outright forced transfer of Gaza's population has been consistently rejected, making it a marginal prospect. Similarly, full Israeli reoccupation is opposed by Israel's own security establishment due to prohibitive costs.
Near Term (6 months): A fragile hybrid structure where Israel retains ultimate security authority while allowing some local governance—either through vetted community figures or limited international oversight. This creates a temporary mechanism for aid delivery and stabilization without resolving Gaza's political status.
Medium Term (12-24 months): An Arab–international consortium becomes more plausible, especially if backed strongly by Washington and coordinated with Gulf and European states. However, this requires Israeli buy-in and depends on securing Israeli concessions in exchange for guarantees on security and hostages.
Overall Assessment: No single scenario will prevail in isolation. A hybrid outcome is likely—Hamas weakened but persisting, Israel maintaining decisive security control, and external actors managing humanitarian and reconstruction efforts without clear political resolution.
The trajectory of Gaza's governance will inevitably shape political and security dynamics in the West Bank. For Israel, the West Bank remains the strategic core, for religious, political, and security reasons. Israeli policies there increasingly reflect a trajectory of de facto annexation, ranging from settlement expansion to legislative initiatives aimed at weakening the prospect of Palestinian sovereignty.
Israeli strategic thinking directly links Gaza to the West Bank. Plans for expanded settlement blocs, annexation laws in the Knesset, and administrative measures are reinforced by military operations in Gaza. In the eyes of current Israeli leadership, weakening both Hamas and the PA undermines the possibility of a unified Palestinian political project, creating conditions more favorable for incremental annexation.
The competing proposals for Gaza's future reveal starkly different visions for Palestinian governance, regional stability, and Israel's long-term security strategy. While the Arab-backed plan offers the most structured path toward reconstruction and a return of the Palestinian Authority, divisions within Israel and the United States continue to complicate the search for consensus.
What happens in Gaza will not remain confined to its borders. The choices made in the coming months will reverberate across the West Bank, either reinforcing the PA's role and stabilizing Palestinian politics or accelerating fragmentation and fueling further cycles of violence. With the stakes extending to questions of annexation, statehood, and regional security, the trajectory of Gaza's "day after" will be decisive in shaping the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Analysis: Armed Clashes, Israeli Airstrikes, and the Future of Syria's Transitional Path
Street scene showing the aftermath of violence in Suwayda, July 2025
In July 2025, Suwayda governorate experienced its most violent sectarian confrontation since the start of Syria's civil war. Triggered by a retaliatory abduction on July 13, fighting between Druze armed groups and Bedouin tribal fighters escalated into urban warfare, extrajudicial killings, and mass displacement. Over 1,000 people were killed, including at least 26 children and 47 women, while nearly 200,000 were displaced amid widespread destruction and humanitarian collapse.
Once considered a relatively stable Druze-majority enclave, Suwayda is now at the heart of Syria's instability, with local governance collapsing and trust in Damascus further eroded. The July 19 ceasefire, despite Syrian military intervention, has repeatedly been violated, highlighting Damascus's limited authority and community mistrust.
Against this backdrop of intensifying conflict, atrocities against civilians and the unraveling of governance have propelled Suwayda into the international spotlight, underscoring the dire humanitarian and political stakes at play. Since our last report, the following developments occurred, raising significant concern about stakeholders' ability to contain the situation:
On July 30, 2025, Israel resumed airstrikes on Sweida, following earlier strikes on July 16 targeting Damascus. Israeli officials framed the actions as deterrence against attacks on Druze areas, responding to pressure from Israel's own Druze community.
Security footage from July 16 revealed the execution of medical worker Muhammad Bahsas inside Suwayda National Hospital by men in military-style uniforms. The Syrian Interior Ministry launched an investigation, pledging arrests and accountability.
In response to state collapse, Druze spiritual leaders, led by Sheikh Hikmat al‑Hijri, formed the 'Supreme Legal Committee' on July 25 to manage legal, administrative, and security affairs.
Despite multiple ceasefires, fighting persisted into August, with Druze armed groups attacking security forces and villages, causing more casualties and eroding stability. The breakdown of security and governance in Suwayda has had rippling effects throughout the region.
With humanitarian agencies struggling to access displaced populations due to ongoing clashes and road blockades, international organizations have raised alarm about the risk of famine and disease outbreaks. Civilian infrastructure, including schools and hospitals, has sustained significant damage, leaving survivors with limited avenues for relief or protection.
The cumulative effects of these developments have not only deepened existing divisions but have also raised existential questions for Syria's political future. As the authority of the central government recedes, local actors increasingly fill the void, asserting their own vision of governance and security.
Cross-border dynamics and the proliferation of armed groups have further complicated efforts to restore order, with Suwayda's fate emblematic of a broader trend toward fragmentation across the country, which can be observed in hotspots of conflict along the Euphrates.
Political, Humanitarian, and Regional Analysis with Recommendations
Medical facilities and emergency response infrastructure in the Suwayda region
The crisis in Suwayda presents a critical challenge to the transitional Syrian government's objective of national reconciliation and territorial unification. Key impacts include:
The government's inability to preempt or quickly contain the violence highlights weaknesses in local governance, particularly in Druze-majority areas that have historically resisted central authority.
The failure to protect civilians and prevent abuses deepens mistrust between communities and undermines reconciliation initiatives.
The emergence of the Suwayda Military Council and other local militias signals a reversion to fragmented security control, contrary to the transitional government's vision.